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Abstract. This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a
class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of Itoˆ
and McKean (1974), p. 108). We provide sufficient conditions under which Nash equilibria are
realised by each player stopping the diffusion at one of the two boundary points of an interval.
The boundaries of this interval solve a system of algebraic equations. We also provide conditions
sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in this class.
Keywords: nonzero-sum Dynkin games; Nash equilibrium; smooth-fit principle; regular
diffusions; free boundary problems.
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1 Introduction
Given a one-dimensional regular diffusion X = (Xt)t≥0 on an interval I ⊆ R, we consider a
two-player Dynkin game [15] in which player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses a stopping time τi in order to
minimise the payoff Ji(τ1, τ2;x), where
J1(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−rτ1G1(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2} + e
−rτ2L1(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}
]
, (1.1)
J2(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−rτ2G2(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1} + e
−rτ1L2(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2}
]
, (1.2)
taking into account the stopping time chosen by player j := 3− i (here Ex denotes the expected
value under the measure Px( · ) = P( · |X0 = x)). In particular we aim to provide sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria of the following threshold type:
τ∗1 =τ1(x
∗
1), τ
∗
2 = τ2(x
∗
2) for some x
∗
1 < x
∗
2, (1.3)
where, for x, z ∈ I, we define Px-a.s. the stopping times
τ1(z) := inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ z} and τ2(z) := inf{t > 0 : Xt ≥ z}, (1.4)
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For i = 1, 2 we refer to Ji(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ;x) as an equilibrium payoff. Our interest in such equilibria is
guided by the seminal paper [7], where equilibrium stopping times are the hitting times of sets
defined by free boundaries.
In our game the stopping cost for player i is equal to either Gi(Xτi) or Li(Xτj ) (continuously
discounted at the rate r > 0), depending on who stops first. While the existence and uniqueness
of Nash equilibria are questions of fundamental interest, it is also valuable to investigate the
structure of equilibria under general dynamics for X, a topic which has so far received relatively
little rigorous mathematical treatment. In particular, having established the existence of an
equilibrium structure such as (1.3) we may derive algebraic characterisations of the thresholds
(that is, x∗1 and x
∗
2 in (1.3)) enabling straightforward numerical evaluation of both the equilibrium
payoffs and stopping times.
1.1 Background and contribution
In this section we briefly review the mathematical literature on Dynkin games (some of the
economic literature will also be recalled in Section 1.2.1) and place our contribution in this
context.
Zero-sum Dynkin games, in which G1 = −L2 and G2 = −L1, have a considerable literature
both in discrete and continuous time (see for instance [1], [2], [6], [9], [13], [17], [26], [27], [28],
[37], [41], [43] and references therein) and in several papers the structure of equilibria has been
studied, beyond the question of their existence and uniqueness. In contrast the literature on
nonzero-sum Dynkin games focuses largely on the existence of Nash equilibria.
Such existence results have been given in both the discrete and the continuous time settings,
using a variety of sufficient conditions and methodologies. In discrete time the approaches
applied include Tarski’s fixed point theorem [30] and martingale methods combined with a
fixed point theorem for monotone mappings [32]; see also [36] and [40]. In continuous time
the methodologies employed include quasi-variational inequalities [34], the general theory of
stochastic processes [18] and the potential theory of Ray-Markov processes [10]; see also [20], [21],
[28] and [29]. Beyond the question of existence, equilibrium payoffs (although not strategies)
are constructed by backward induction in [35]. Additional technical questions arising in the
continuous time setting, concerning appropriate notions of subgame-perfect equilibrium, are
considered in [39].
In the present paper we take X to be a weak solution of a stochastic differential equation
(SDE) on an interval I = (x, x) and employ probabilistic methods so that, unlike in analytical
settings such as that of [7], the coefficients of this SDE are only assumed to be continuous. We
provide sufficient conditions on the functions Li and Gi for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
whose strategies have the structure (1.3), together with sufficient conditions for uniqueness of
the equilibrium in this class. Our method is the following: we show that if player 1 stops at
the hitting time of a half-line (x, z1] then player 2’s best reply is the hitting time to a half-line
[z2,1, x) where z2,1 > z1 depends on z1. The same arguments produce symmetric results if we
start by letting player 2 stop at the hitting time of a half-line [z2, x). The key point is then to
show that there exists a fixed point, i.e. a couple of intervals (x, x∗1] and [x
∗
2, x) such that the
corresponding hitting times are the best replies to one another and (1.3) forms an equilibrium.
To construct each player’s best reply to the opponent’s stopping rule we draw on the geometric
characterisation of r-excessive mappings due to Dynkin [16] and later generalised in [12].
Our work complements recent related work by Attard [5] (see also [4]), which became avail-
able during the final drafting of the present paper. In [5] the structure of Nash equilibria is
studied for regular linear diffusions absorbed at either 0 or 1. Here instead we consider regular
linear diffusions on an interval I ⊆ R killed at a (possibly state-dependent) rate and cover all
boundary behaviours which are not non-singular. The methodology in [5] differs from our ap-
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proach, which is to construct the solution by taking into account the geometry of the stopping
cost functions. In contrast in [5] the equilibrium payoffs are hypothesised to satisfy the so-called
double smooth-fit principle, according to which they are continuously differentiable at the corre-
sponding equilibrium stopping threshold x∗i . Based on this principle two coupled free boundary
problems are formulated and solved explicitly, producing functions u and v which can be verified
as the equilibrium payoffs of the game. In the present paper we observe double smooth fit in
some equilibria (in particular see Section 3.1), but we also find equilibria outside this setting
(see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). Finally a more technical difference is that due to the absorbing
behaviour at 0 and 1, the main result in [5] (Theorem 4.1) assumes that Gi(0) = Li(0) and
Gi(1) = Li(1), i = 1, 2 (here we use our notation for the payoffs). We allow instead the limiting
behaviour given in (2.10) and in (2.18) below for Gi and Li, respectively.
1.2 Outline of main results
In order to present the main results we first note properties of the underlying regular diffusion
X. In general the behaviour of the process X at the boundaries of I ⊆ R may be of several
types [22] and we will assume that the upper endpoint of I is natural, while the lower one is
not non-singular : that is, either natural, exit-not-entrance or entrance-not-exit (see for instance
[8], Ch. 2, pp. 18–20). For the unfamiliar reader the terminology is explained in more detail in
Section 2.2 where other analytical properties of X are also addressed.
Beginning with the case of natural boundaries (which includes Brownian motion, geometric
Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process), we establish sufficient conditions on Gi
and Li (see the next section for details) for the existence of a Nash equilibrium (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) of the
threshold type (1.3). Under these conditions the smooth fit principle holds for the equilibrium
payoff x 7→ Ji(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ;x) at the corresponding equilibrium threshold x
∗
i (i.e. the payoff is con-
tinuously differentiable at x∗i ). These thresholds may therefore be characterised by a system of
algebraic equations. We then show that if the functions Li are assumed to have appropriate
smoothness, we may also provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
amongst strategies of the threshold type (1.3).
Analogous results are obtained in the case when the lower endpoint is either an exit-not-
entrance or an entrance-not-exit boundary, thus addressing Bessel processes (depending on their
parameters) and related processes such as the CIR (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross) and CEV (constant
elasticity of variance) process. In these settings we also find equilibria in which one of the two
players never stops, and equilibria with a structure possibly more complex than (1.3) depending
on the initial value of X (see Proposition 3.16).
We also indicate in Appendix A.3 the extension to a state dependent discount factor. Other
combinations of natural, exit-not-entrance and entrance-not-exit boundaries may be addressed
via the methods of this paper (indeed this is immediate by symmetry when the lower boundary
is natural and the upper one not non-singular).
1.2.1 Conditions on the problem data
We consider stopping costs Li and Gi fulfilling suitable assumptions of integrability and smooth-
ness (cf. Definitions 2.3, 2.4). Moreover, they satisfy the sufficient conditions applied below,
which are motivated by the threshold type equilibrium structure (1.3). For i = 1, 2 these are:
(a) Li < Gi,
(b) Γ1∩Γ2 = ∅, where Γi denotes the closure of Γi := {x : (LX−r)Gi(x) > 0} and LX denotes
the infinitesimal generator of X,
(c) The equation (LX − r)Gi(x) = 0 has a single root.
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In our setup player i chooses a stopping time τi, or equivalently a pure strategy (see, for
example, [39] for discussion on pure and mixed strategies in continuous time). Our requirement
(a) specifies that each player locally has an incentive to act second: in the context of stopping
games, this is a war of attrition (see, e.g., [33]). It is worth mentioning here that in the opposite
situation, in which Li > Gi, each player locally has an incentive to act first and the game belongs
to the class of preemption games, see for example [19] for a deterministic setting and [3, 42] for
a stochastic framework. In the literature on preemption games, equilibria are usually realised
in mixed rather than pure strategies. Requirement (a) is therefore reasonable in a study of
threshold-type strategies, which are pure strategies constructed from hitting times.
Condition (b) addresses the cost functions Gi, which are the costs for stopping first. An
argument using Dynkin’s formula, which is standard in optimal stopping and is also provided in
Appendix A.4, establishes that player i will not stop on the set {x : (LX − r)Gi(x) < 0}. Our
requirement (b) therefore means that locally at least one player is incentivised to wait rather
than accepting the stopping cost. This implies that the players do not stop simultaneously.
Motivated by the latter argument, let us temporarily fix the strategy of player i. Then it
is reasonable to suppose that if the function x 7→ gj(x) := (LX − r)Gj(x), j = 3 − i, changes
sign many times, the optimal strategy for player j (given player i’s strategy) may involve several
disjoint regions on which it is optimal to stop. Since condition (c) ensures that the function
gj changes sign at most once on I, this suggests that the optimal strategy for player j (given
player i’s strategy) should be to stop the process upon hitting a connected set. Indeed this type
of condition is commonly used in the literature on optimal stopping problems in order to ensure
that the solution is a stopping time of threshold type.
In principle our techniques may also apply under conditions other than (a)–(c), in which
case equilibria with other structures can arise. This point is illustrated in Section 3.4, where
condition (b) is replaced by the following alternative:
(d) Either Γ1 ⊂ Γ2 or Γ2 ⊂ Γ1.
In this case it is necessary to slightly generalise the structure of (1.3) as one of the players may
never stop. Such equilibria have been obtained in the economics literature for instance by Murto
[33] but in Section 3.4 we consider more general specifications of the stochastic process X and
of the stopping costs Li and Gi than those used in [33].
Note that the threshold type structure we study has some degree of overlap with that of
some zero-sum games of optimal stopping (see, e.g., [2]). However a characterisation of the
equilibrium stopping thresholds in our game cannot be achieved via methods usually employed
for zero-sum games. Indeed in this paper we deal with the joint optimisation of the coupled
system of payoffs (1.1)-(1.2). The latter reduces to a simpler problem with a single payoff in the
zero-sum case. From a PDE point of view this can be understood by noticing that a zero-sum
game is usually associated to a variational inequality (see, e.g. [2]) whereas a nonzero-sum game
must be associated to a system of coupled variational inequalities (see, e.g. [7]).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the nonzero-sum Dynkin
game, together with the dynamics and our assumptions and sufficient conditions on the stopping
costs. Existence and uniqueness results for Nash equilibria of threshold type are proved in Section
3 for different combinations of boundary behaviour. In Section 3.4 we consider slightly weaker
assumptions on the stopping costs. In the Appendix we generalise our results to state dependent
discount factors and provide some auxiliary proofs.
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2 Setting
We begin by formally stating the game presented in the Introduction and by providing a rigorous
definition of a Nash equilibrium in Section 2.1. Then we describe the class of diffusions involved
in the optimisation (see Section 2.2), whose analytical properties are finally used in Sections 2.3
and 2.4 to characterise the class of stopping costs to be used in the game, i.e. Gi, Li, i = 1, 2 in
(1.1) and (1.2).
2.1 The nonzero-sum Dynkin game
On a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 which
satisfies the standard assumptions, we consider a real-valued diffusion process X := (Xt)t≥0. Its
state space is an interval I ⊆ R and we denote the explosion time by
σ I := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ I}. (2.1)
Further details concerning the diffusion X will be provided in the next section.
In order to formally introduce the two-player nonzero-sum game of stopping we denote
T := {τ : τ is an F-stopping time and τ ≤ σI a.s.},
and when no confusion may arise we also denote player 1 by P1 and player 2 by P2. For a given
τ2 ∈ T , player P1 aims at minimising the payoff J1(τ1, τ2;x) in (1.1) by optimally choosing their
stopping time τ1 ∈ T . Analogously, given τ1 ∈ T , P2 chooses the stopping time τ2 ∈ T in order
to minimise J2(τ1, τ2;x) in (1.2).
In order to cover the events ω for which σI(ω) = +∞, for any real-valued Borel function f
and any τ ∈ T , we set
e−rτf(Xτ )1{τ=+∞} = 0 Px-a.s. for all x ∈ I. (2.2)
Before proceeding further we provide the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. For x ∈ I we say that a couple (τ1, τ2) ∈ T × T is a Nash equilibrium for the
two-player nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping, started at x, if and only if{
J1(τ1, τ2;x) ≤ J1(ρ, τ2;x), ∀ ρ ∈ T ,
J2(τ1, τ2;x) ≤ J2(τ1, ρ;x), ∀ ρ ∈ T .
(2.3)
We also say that vi(x) := Ji(τ1, τ2;x) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff for the i-th player.
Further, if the couple (τ1, τ2) is an equilibrium in the game started at x for each x ∈ I, we simply
say that (τ1, τ2) is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 The underlying diffusion
Let B = (Bt)t≥0 be a one dimensional standard Brownian motion on (Ω,F ,P) adapted to F,
then our diffusion X is defined as follows. The triple (Ω,F ,P),F, (X,B) is a weak solution of
the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dBt, X0 = x ∈ I, (2.4)
for some Borel-measurable functions µ, σ : R→ R to be specified. To account for the dependence
of X on its initial position, from now on we shall write Xx where appropriate and Px to refer
to the probability measure such that Px(·) = P(·|X0 = x), x ∈ I. Throughout the paper we
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will equivalently use the notations E[f(Xxt )] and Ex[f(Xt)], f : R → R Borel-measurable and
integrable, to refer to expectations under the measure Px.
We denote by I the closure of I and assume that I = (x, x) ⊆ R so that x and x are (not
necessarily finite) boundary points for X. The upper boundary point x is assumed to be natural,
whereas the lower one x is either natural, exit-not-entrance or entrance-not-exit (see for instance
Ch. 2, pp. 18–20, of [8] for a characterisation of the boundary behaviour of diffusions). We recall
that x (or equivalently x) is natural if the process cannot start from there and when starting
from x ∈ I it cannot reach x (resp. x) in finite time; x is exit-not-entrance if the process cannot
start from x but can reach it in finite time (hence σI < +∞ with positive probability); finally
x is entrance-not-exit if the process can start from x but it cannot reach it in finite time when
started from x ∈ I.
For the coefficients of the SDE (2.4) we make the following assumption, which will hold
throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.2. The functions µ and σ are continuous in I with σ2 > 0 in I.
As a consequence of the above assumption one has that for every y ∈ I there exists εo > 0
such that ∫ y+εo
y−εo
1 + |µ(ξ)|
|σ(ξ)|2
dξ < +∞.
The latter guarantees that (2.4) has indeed a weak solution that is unique in the sense of
probability law (up to the time σI , cf. [24], Ch. 5.5).
We now recall some basic analytical properties of diffusions, which are also going to be used
later on to characterise the functions Gi, Li appearing as stopping costs in the game (recall (1.1)
and (1.2)). We refer the reader to Ch. 2 of [8] for a detailed exposition. Under Assumption 2.2,
the diffusion process X is regular in I; that is, if
τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y} (2.5)
one has Px(τ(y) <∞) > 0 for every x and y in I so that the state space cannot be decomposed
into smaller sets from which X cannot exit. The continuity of µ and σ imply that the scale
function has derivative
S′(x) := exp
(
−
∫ x
xo
2µ(ξ)
σ2(ξ)
dξ
)
, x ∈ I,
for any fixed reference point xo ∈ I, and the speed measure has density
m′(x) :=
2
σ2(x)S′(x)
, x ∈ I.
We define the infinitesimal generator LX of X by(
LXu
)
(x) :=
1
2
σ2(x)u′′(x) + µ(x)u′(x), x ∈ I,
for any u ∈ C2(I). Then, for fixed r > 0, under Assumption 2.2 there always exist two linearly
independent, strictly positive solutions of the ordinary differential equation LXu = ru satisfying
a set of boundary conditions based on the boundary behaviour of X (see, e.g., pp. 18–19 of
[8]). These functions span the set of solutions of LXu = ru and are uniquely defined up to
multiplication if one of them is required to be strictly increasing and the other one to be strictly
decreasing. We denote the strictly increasing solution ψr and the strictly decreasing one φr. For
x, y ∈ I and τ(y) as in (2.5) one has
Ex
[
e−rτ(y)
]
=

ψr(x)
ψr(y)
, x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
, x > y.
(2.6)
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We recall that the Wronskian
W :=
ψ′r(x)φr(x)− φ
′
r(x)ψr(x)
S′(x)
, x ∈ I, (2.7)
is a positive constant and we introduce the Green function
r(x, y) := W−1 ·
{
ψr(x)φr(y), x ≤ y,
φr(x)ψr(y), x ≥ y.
The latter can be used to obtain the representation formula for the resolvent
Ex
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt
]
=
∫
I
f(y)r(x, y)m′(y)dy, x ∈ I, (2.8)
which holds for any continuous function f : I → R such that the integrals are well defined.
Moreover the following useful equations hold for any x < a < b < x (cf. par. 10, Ch. 2 of [8]):
ψ′r(b)
S′(b)
−
ψ′r(a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
ψr(y)m
′(y)dy,
φ′r(b)
S′(b)
−
φ′r(a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
φr(y)m
′(y)dy. (2.9)
2.3 Classes of stopping cost functions
In order to clarify the assumptions concerning the stopping costs Gi, Li, i = 1, 2 appearing in
(1.1) and (1.2) we need first to introduce the class of functions below.
Definition 2.3. Let A be the class of real valued functions H ∈ C2(I) such that
lim
x→x
H
φr
(x) = 0, lim
x→x
H
ψr
(x) = 0 (2.10)
and Ex
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rt
∣∣h(Xt)∣∣dt] <∞ (2.11)
for all x ∈ I and with h(x) := (LXH − rH)(x).
In this paper, elements of A will be often denoted by H and then the corresponding lower case
letter h will denote the function h(x) := (LXH − rH)(x).
We provide some formulae for functions in A which will be useful in the rest of the paper.
Using Itoˆ’s formula, (2.10) and standard localisation arguments one can show that for H ∈ A
we have
H(x) = −Ex
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rth(Xt)dt
]
, x ∈ I. (2.12)
Then applying the representation (2.8) we get the equivalent expression
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy + ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy
]
(2.13)
and straightforward calculations also give(H
φr
)′
(x) = −
1
W
(
ψr
φr
)′
(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy. (2.14)
For our study we also consider the following subsets of A.
Definition 2.4. We say that H ∈ A lies in the class A1 if h( · ) has a unique zero at xh ∈ I and
lim infx→x h(x) > 0 and lim supx→x h(x) < 0. Alternatively we say that H ∈ A2 if −H ∈ A1.
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Several proofs below use a geometric approach to optimal stopping which requires the fol-
lowing change of variables. As in [12], eq. (4.6), we define the strictly increasing function
Fr(x) :=
ψr(x)
φr(x)
, x ∈ I, (2.15)
together with its inverse function F−1r and for any continuous real function H on I we set
Hˆ(y) :=
{ (
H
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y), y > 0,
0, y = 0.
(2.16)
In what follows (see, e.g., Lemma 3.1) for H ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2 we denote
yˆh := Fr(xh)
For the benefit of the unfamiliar reader we provide in Appendix A.1 a proof of the next well
known result (see also Section 6, p. 192 in [12]).
Lemma 2.5. Let x1, x2 ∈ I and set yi := Fr(xi), i = 1, 2. Moreover let H ∈ C
2(I) and define
Hˆ as in (2.16) and h := (LX − r)H. Then
Hˆ(y) is strictly convex on (y1, y2) ⇐⇒ h(x) > 0 on (x1, x2). (2.17)
2.4 Sufficient conditions on the stopping costs and notation
Here we formulate the statements (a), (b) and (c) of Section 1.2.1 in the above setting. We
will show in Section 3 that these conditions are sufficient for the existence of Nash equilibria
of threshold type (1.3). It is convenient to recall the notation Γi for the closure of the sets
Γi := {x ∈ I : (LX − r)Gi(x) > 0}, i = 1, 2.
Assumption 2.6. (i) For i = 1, 2 we have Li, Gi ∈ C(I;R) with Li < Gi on I;
(ii) G1 ∈ A1 and G2 ∈ A2 with Γ1 ∩ Γ2 = ∅;
(iii) For i = 1, 2 we have
lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣Li
φr
∣∣∣(x) < +∞ and lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣Li
ψr
∣∣∣(x) < +∞. (2.18)
In fact parts (i) and (ii) slightly refine conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 1.2.1, since we
now require the sign of (LX − r)Gi to be asymptotically non-zero at the endpoints of I. We
have introduced condition (iii) to ensure the finiteness of the game’s payoffs (see e.g. [12]).
It is useful to introduce also some notation related to the above assumptions on the stopping
costs. We recall (2.16) and for i = 1, 2 we set Gˆi and Lˆi to be the transformations of Gi, Li.
Definition 2.7 (Notation). For i = 1, 2 and Gi ∈ Ai we define
1. gi(x) := (LX − r)Gi(x), x ∈ I;
2. xˆi the unique point at which the sign of gi(x) changes and yˆi := Fr(xˆi);
3. yi the unique stationary point of Gˆi in (0, yˆi), whenever it exists.
For i = 1, 2 and Li ∈ Ai we define
4. ℓi(x) := (LX − r)Li(x), x ∈ I;
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5. xˇi the unique point at which the sign of ℓi(x) changes and yˇi := Fr(xˇi);
6. y˜i the unique stationary point of Lˆi in (0, yˇi), whenever it exists.
Notice that Gˆi and Lˆi as in Definition 2.7 have at most one stationary point in (0, yˆi) and (0, yˇi),
respectively, due to Lemma 2.5. Note also that in this setting
Γ1 ∩ Γ2 = ∅ ⇐⇒ xˆ1 < xˆ2.
Remark 2.8. For natural and entrance-not-exit boundaries we have φr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↓ x and
ψr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↑ x so that bounded functions Gi satisfy (2.10), for example. In the case of an
exit-not-entrance boundary which is explored in Section 3.3, however, (2.10) is more restrictive
and so it is relaxed in the latter section, yielding an additional term in (2.12) (cf. (3.41)). We
also note that all the results in this paper remain true if in the definition of A the regularity of
H is weakened by requiring H ∈W 2,∞loc (I).
3 Construction of Nash equilibria
In this section we develop our existence and uniqueness results under different combinations
of diffusion boundary behaviour. We are then able to provide an algebraic characterisation of
the optimal thresholds, as a system of two equations in two unknowns (or reducing in special
cases to one equation in one unknown, with another threshold formally located at one of the
endpoints x and x). We begin in Section 3.1 under the assumption that the endpoints x < x of
I are natural for X, then consider an entrance-not-exit lower boundary x in Section 3.2 and an
exit-not-entrance lower boundary in Section 3.3.
3.1 The case of natural boundaries
When x and x are both natural boundary points we have (see par. 10, Sec. 2 of [8]):
lim
x↓x
ψr(x) = 0, lim
x↓x
φr(x) =∞, lim
x↑x
ψr(x) =∞, lim
x↑x
φr(x) = 0, (3.1)
lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0, lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= −∞, lim
x↑x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
=∞, lim
x↑x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0. (3.2)
The following lemma provides geometric properties associated with the classes A1, A2 of
Definition 2.4, and is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Let H ∈ A1 (respectively A2). Then Hˆ:
i) is strictly convex (resp. concave) on (0, yˆh) and strictly concave (resp. convex) on (yˆh,∞),
ii) satisfies Hˆ(0+) = 0 and Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞ (resp. +∞);
iii) has a unique global minimum (resp. maximum) in (0, yˆh) and limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = +∞ (resp.
−∞); finally Hˆ is monotonic increasing (resp. decreasing) on (yˆh,+∞).
In order to prove our main results, for i = 1, 2 and u, v > 0 let us introduce the functions
Li(u, v) := Gˆi(u)− Lˆi(v)− Gˆ
′
i(u)(u− v). (3.3)
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Theorem 3.2 (Existence of an equilibrium). Under Assumption 2.6 there exists a solution
(y∗1 , y
∗
2) of the problem:
Find (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)× (yˆ2,+∞) such that
{
L1(y1, y2) = 0,
L2(y2, y1) = 0.
(3.4)
Writing x∗1 := F
−1
r (y
∗
1) ∈ (x, xˆ1) and x
∗
2 := F
−1
r (y
∗
2) ∈ (xˆ2, x) and recalling (1.4), the couple
τ∗1 = τ1(x
∗
1), τ
∗
2 = τ2(x
∗
2) (3.5)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is divided into three steps. In Step 1 we assume that P1 picks a stopping time
τ1(z) as defined in (1.4), for some z ∈ (x, xˆ1). We then construct P2’s best reply, showing that
it has the form τ2(x2) as defined in (1.4), for some x2 ∈ (xˆ2, x) which depends on z. Step 2
reverses the roles of the two players, and in Step 3 we combine these results to construct a Nash
equilibrium.
Step 1 (Player 2’s best reply). Given P1’s choice τ1(z) described above, P2 is faced with an
optimal stopping problem of the form
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤τ1(z)} + L2(Xτ1(z))e
−rτ1(z)1{τ>τ1(z)}
]
. (3.6)
Setting ζ := Fr(z), it is shown in Proposition A.1 that if the equation
L2( · , ζ) = 0 (3.7)
has a solution y2(ζ) ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) (which is therefore unique), then the stopping time τ2(x2) with
x2 = x2(z) := F
−1
r (y2(ζ))
is optimal in (3.6). In the rest of this step we prove existence and uniqueness of the solution
y2(ζ) ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) to (3.7).
Notice that ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1), hence ζ < yˆ2, and by strict concavity of Gˆ2 on (0, yˆ2) one has
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)(yˆ2 − ζ) < Gˆ2(yˆ2)− Gˆ2(ζ). (3.8)
By substituting the above inequality into (3.3) we get
L2(yˆ2, ζ) > Gˆ2(ζ)− Lˆ2(ζ) > 0, (3.9)
(noting that Gˆ2 > Lˆ2 by (i) in Assumption 2.6). Also, u 7→ L2(u, ζ) is decreasing for u ∈
(yˆ2,+∞) since
∂
∂u
L2(u, ζ) = −Gˆ
′′
2(u)(u − ζ) < 0 by the convexity of Gˆ2 and the fact that
ζ < yˆ1 < yˆ2 < u.
Next we show that L2(u, ζ)→ −∞ as u→ +∞. To this end, note that Gˆ2 is decreasing on
(yˆ2,+∞) (Lemma 3.1), so
lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ
′
2(u)(u− ζ)
]
≤ lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ
′
2(u)u
]
. (3.10)
Since Lˆ2 is bounded on (0, yˆ1) (Assumption 2.6), from (3.3) it is now sufficient to establish that
the latter limit equals −∞.
The chain rule and (2.14) (taking H = G2 and h = g2) give
Gˆ′2(u)u =
u
F ′r
(
F−1r (u)
)(G2
φr
)′(
F−1r (u)
)
= −
u
W
∫ x
F−1r (u)
φr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt.
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Setting u = Fr(s), s ∈ I, from (2.13) we obtain
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ
′
2(u)u = −W
−1
∫ s
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt. (3.11)
Fix δ > 0. By the conditions on our stopping costs, the function g2 is bounded below on
[xˆ2 + δ, x) by a constant εδ > 0. When s > xˆ2 + δ we split the integral above on the intervals
(x, xˆ2 + δ] and [xˆ2 + δ, x), then use the bound on g2 and (2.9) to obtain that
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ
′
2(u)u ≤−W
−1
[ ∫ xˆ2+δ
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt+
εδ
r
(ψ′r(s)
S′(s)
−
ψ′r(xˆ2 + δ)
S′(xˆ2 + δ)
)]
(3.12)
which tends to −∞ as s ↑ x by (3.2). This completes Step 1.
As we will see in the proof of Proposition 3.4, equation (3.7) may be interpreted as a ge-
ometric version of the so called smooth-fit equation for P2, which specifies that (3.6) should
be continuously differentiable in x across the optimal boundary x∗2. From the arbitrariness of
z ∈ (x, xˆ1) and a simple application of the implicit function theorem we obtain that the map
z 7→ x2(z) is continuous on (x, xˆ1), or equivalently y2( · ) ∈ C((0, yˆ1)) (see, e.g., Th. 10.2.1 on p.
270 of [14]).
Step 2 (Player 1’s best reply) Similarly suppose that P2 picks z ∈ (xˆ2, x) and decides to stop at
time τ2(z). Then P1 is faced with an optimal stopping problem of the form
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ2(z)} + L1(Xτ2(z))e
−rτ2(z)1{τ≥τ2(z)}
]
. (3.13)
It may be proven just as in Step 1 that (with ζ := Fr(z)) the equation
L1( · , ζ) = 0 (3.14)
has a unique solution y1(ζ) ∈ (0, yˆ1). Notice by (3.14) that y1(ζ) > 0 is guaranteed in this
setting, by observing that Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞ (see Lemma 3.1). Then an optimal stopping time
for P1 is τ1(x1) where the optimal boundary point is x1 = x1(z) := F
−1
r (y1(ζ)) (see Appendix
A.4.2).
Again, the map z 7→ x1(z) is continuous on (xˆ2, x) (or equivalently y1( · ) ∈ C((yˆ2,+∞))) by
the implicit function theorem and arbitrariness of z.
Step 3 (A fixed point). With the continuous functions x2(·), x1(·) defined as in Steps 1 and 2
respectively, suppose now that there exist two points x∗1, x
∗
2 ∈ I with x
∗
1 < x
∗
2 such that
x∗2 = x2(x
∗
1), (3.15)
x∗1 = x1(x
∗
2). (3.16)
Let us take τ∗1 = τ1(x
∗
1), τ
∗
2 = τ2(x
∗
2) and show that they form a Nash equilibrium (Definition
2.1). Since Step 1 constructs P2’s best reponse to τ
∗
1 over all stopping times τ ∈ T , we have
from (3.15) that the lower inequality in (2.3) is satisfied. Similarly Step 2 implies that the upper
inequality in (2.3) is satisfied, and so the pair (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. In this step we will
therefore establish the existence of x∗1 < x
∗
2 satisfying (3.15)–(3.16).
We thus seek y∗2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) such that L2(y
∗
2 , y1(y
∗
2)) = 0. By the regularity of G2, L2 and
y1 we have u 7→ L2(u, y1(u)) continuous on (yˆ2,+∞). We conclude just as in (3.8) and (3.9)
that L2(yˆ2, y1(yˆ2)) > 0. Since the point ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1) in (3.10) does not need to be constant for
the latter inequality to hold, the proof of Step 1 also gives that limu↑+∞ L2(u, y1(u)) = −∞ and
we conclude that L2( · , y1( · )) has a root y
∗
2. From Step 1 we know that L2(·, y1(y
∗
2)) = 0 has a
unique solution, denoted by y2(y1(y
∗
2)), hence y
∗
2 = y2(y1(y
∗
2)). Therefore setting y
∗
1 := y1(y
∗
2),
we have obtained a solution of (3.15)-(3.16) with x∗1 := F
−1
r (y
∗
1) and x
∗
2 := F
−1
r (y
∗
2).
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It is worth observing that if (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)×(yˆ2,+∞) is an arbitrary solution of (3.4), then
in particular y2 is the unique solution of L2( · , y1) = 0 in (yˆ2,+∞) by Step 1 in the proof above.
Therefore, recalling (1.4) and Step 1, the stopping time τ2(x2) with x2 := F
−1
r (y2) is optimal in
(3.6) when z = F−1r (y1) =: x1. Analogously, from Step 2 we find that τ1(x1) is optimal in (3.13)
when z = x2 and therefore the couple (τ1(x1), τ2(x2)) forms a Nash equilibrium.
Conversely suppose that a couple (τ1(x1), τ2(x2)), x1 < x2, forms a Nash equilibrium in the
class of threshold type strategies (1.4). Then from Step 1 we have that y2 := Fr(x2) must be
the solution of L2( · , y1) = 0 in (yˆ2,+∞), with y1 := Fr(x1). Similarly Step 2 implies that y1
solves L1( · , y2) = 0 in (0, yˆ1).
Therefore we have established an equivalence which is summarised in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Let Assumption 2.6 hold. A couple (τˆ1, τˆ2) := (τ1(x1), τ2(x2)), with x < x1 <
x2 < x, forms a Nash equilibrium in the class of threshold type strategies (1.3) if and only if
y1 = Fr(x1) and y2 = Fr(x2) are a solution of problem (3.4).
Next we verify some analytical expressions associated to the equilibrium payoffs constructed
above. We apply Itoˆ’s formula but note that direct calculations involving the Laplace transforms
of τ∗i , i = 1, 2 (see Theorem 3.2) and the equilibrium payoffs of the game would also suffice.
Proposition 3.4. Let Assumption 2.6 hold and let (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1) × (yˆ2,+∞) be a solution
of (3.4). With x1, x2, τˆ1, τˆ2 as in Corollary 3.3, (τˆ1, τˆ2) forms a Nash equilibrium. Moreover the
functions
v1(x) :=

G1(x), x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x) + q1φr(x), x1 < x < x2,
L1(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.17)
and
v2(x) :=

L2(x), x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x) + q2φr(x), x1 < x < x2,
G2(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.18)
with
m1 :=
(G1/φr)(x1)− (L1/φr)(x2)
Fr(x1)− Fr(x2)
, q1 :=
L1
φr
(x2)−m1Fr(x2), (3.19)
m2 :=
(G2/φr)(x2)− (L2/φr)(x1)
Fr(x2)− Fr(x1)
, q2 :=
L2
φr
(x1)−m2Fr(x1), (3.20)
coincide with the equilibrium payoffs of the two players, i.e. vi(x) = Ji(τˆ1, τˆ2;x), i = 1, 2. In
particular v1 ∈ C(I) with v1 ∈W
2,∞
loc (x, x2), v2 ∈ C(I) with v2 ∈W
2,∞
loc (x1, x) and they solve
(LX − r)vi(x) = 0, x1 < x < x2, i = 1, 2 (3.21)
(LX − r)v1(x) > 0, x < x < x1 (3.22)
(LX − r)v2(x) > 0, x2 < x < x (3.23)
vi ≤ Gi, x ∈ I, i = 1, 2. (3.24)
Proof. The fact that (τˆ1, τˆ2) defines a Nash equilibrium follows from Corollary 3.3. The rest of
the proof is organised in three steps.
Step 1 (Regularity of vi). At this point we recall the smooth change of variables defined in (2.16),
writing x = F−1r (y). Applying this change of variables to v1 in (3.17), the function y 7→ vˆ1(y) is
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a straight line on (y1, y2). The coefficients of this straight line, given in (3.19), ensure that vˆ1 is
continuous on (0,∞), and hence that v1 ∈ C(I).
Further by the definition of L1 in (3.3), it follows from the system (3.4) that the gradient
of this straight line is equal to the derivative of Gˆ1 at y1. We conclude that vˆ1 is continuously
differentiable at y1 or, equivalently, that v1 is continuously differentiable at x1. In this sense
equation (3.14) is a geometric version of the smooth fit equation for v1. It follows immediately
that v1 is continuously differentiable on (x, x2). Similarly by direct calculations and (3.17)-(3.18)
we can check that v′′1 is indeed a locally bounded function on (x, x2), hence v1 ∈ W
2,∞
loc (x, x2).
We can proceed in a similar way for v2.
Step 2 (Free boundary problem). The equations (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23) follow directly from the
definition of vi, by recalling that φr and ψr solve LXu − ru = 0, and by the fact that x1 < xˆ1
and x2 > xˆ2. For the final inequalities (the so-called obstacle conditions) we refer again to the
transformation (2.16). The transformed function Gˆ1 is convex in (0, yˆ1), it reaches its unique
global minimum therein and it is concave in (yˆ1,+∞). By the smooth fit property established
above at y1 ∈ (0, yˆ1), it follows from vˆ1(y2) = Lˆ1(y2) < Gˆ1(y2) that we must also have vˆ1 ≤ Gˆ1
on (y1, y2). Therefore we have v1 ≤ G1 in (x, x2) and v1 = L1 < G1 in [x2, x). Symmetric
arguments hold for v2.
Step 3 (Verification argument). Here we show that indeed vi, i = 1, 2 coincide with the equi-
librium payoffs. As a byproduct, this step offers an alternative way of showing that (τˆ1, τˆ2) is
a Nash equilibrium, starting from the solution of (3.21)–(3.24) (this is the original approach of
[7]).
Let σ ∈ T be arbitrary. Then we have
v1(x) =Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τˆ2)v1(Xσ∧τˆ2)−
∫ σ∧τˆ2
0
e−rt(LX − r)v1(Xt)dt
]
≤Ex
[
e−rσG1(X
x
σ )1{σ<τˆ2} + e
−rτˆ2L1(Xτˆ2)1{σ≥τˆ2}
]
= J1(σ, τˆ2;x). (3.25)
Here the first line follows from Itoˆ-Tanaka’s formula (justified by the regularity of v1) and
a standard localisation argument, and the second line follows from (3.17), (3.21), (3.22) and
(3.24). In particular, setting σ = τˆ1 in (3.25) we obtain v1(x) = J1(τˆ1, τˆ2;x). Arguing similarly
for v2 yields the claimed equivalence of vi, i = 1, 2 with the equilibrium payoffs.
The application of Itoˆ’s formula in Step 3 of the latter proof also yields the following (sub)-
martingale property of the processes t 7→ e−rtvi(Xt), i = 1, 2. This is the analogue in our game
setting of the well established (sub)-martingale property in optimal stopping problems with
minimisation over stopping times (see, e.g., [38], Chapter 5, Section 2.3).
Corollary 3.5. Let (τˆ1, τˆ2) be as in Proposition 3.4 and vi, i = 1, 2 the related equilibrium
payoffs for the two players. For i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j set
Y it := e
−rtvi(Xt), G
i
t := e
−rtGi(Xt), L
i
t := e
−rtLi(Xt), t ≥ 0 (3.26)
then (Y it∧τˆj )t≥0 is a continuous sub-martingale, (Y
i
t∧τˆi∧τˆj
)t≥0 is a continuous martingale, Y
i
t ≤ G
i
t
for all t ≥ 0 and Y iτˆi∧τˆj = G
i
τˆi
1{τˆi<τˆj} + L
i
τˆj
1{τˆi>τˆj} (notice that Px(τˆ1 = τˆ2) = 0 for all x ∈ I).
Our nonzero-sum game may have multiple Nash equilibria but we now provide sufficient
conditions under which the equilibrium of Theorem 3.2 is unique in the class (1.3). For this we
will consider the auxiliary problem
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )
]
, x ∈ I, (3.27)
which corresponds to the optimal stopping problem for P2 if P1 decides never to stop. The proof
of the next lemma is standard and we provide it in Appendix A.2.
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Lemma 3.6. There is a unique solution y∞2 in (yˆ2,+∞) of Gˆ
′
2(y)y − Gˆ2(y) = 0. Setting
x∞2 := F
−1
r (y
∞
2 ) > xˆ2 and recalling (1.4), the stopping time τ
∞
2 := τ2(x
∞
2 ) is an optimal
stopping time for (3.27).
Let y∞1 be the unique y ∈ (0, yˆ1) that solves L1( · , y
∞
2 ) = 0, whose existence we know from
Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Then the latter arguments also give us the next corollary.
Corollary 3.7. Set x∞1 := F
−1
r (y
∞
1 ) < xˆ1. Then τ
∞
1 := τ1(x
∞
1 ) (see (1.4)) provides the best
reply of P1 when P2 stops at τ
∞
2 .
For future reference it is worth recalling that the optimal stopping problem for P1 when P2 stops
at τ∞2 is
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ∞2 } + e
−rτ∞2 L1(Xτ∞2 )1{τ≥τ∞2 }
]
, x ∈ I. (3.28)
Recalling y˜i, i = 1, 2, from Definition 2.7 we are now ready to state our uniqueness result.
Theorem 3.8 (Uniqueness of the equilibrium). Let Assumption 2.6 hold and let us also
assume
(i) Li ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2
(ii) y˜2 > yˆ1
(iii) Gˆ′1(y
∞
1 ) < Lˆ
′
1(y
∞
2 )
Then problem (3.4) has a unique solution. Writing x∗i = F
−1
r (y
∗
i ), i = 1, 2, then (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is the
unique couple such that (τ1(x
∗
1), τ2(x
∗
2)) as in (1.3) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the game.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to show that the functions ζ 7→ yi(ζ) for i = 1, 2 found
in the proof of Theorem 3.2 are monotonic, respectively increasing and decreasing, so that they
intersect at most once and (3.15)-(3.16) has a unique solution. Uniqueness of the equilibrium
(in the class (1.3)) then follows by Corollary 3.3. We adopt the notation of Theorem 3.2 and
observe that under the additional regularity assumptions on Li the implicit function theorem
implies that yi( · ) ∈ C
1(Oi) with i = 1, 2 and O1 := (yˆ2,+∞), O2 := (0, yˆ1). In fact denoting by
∂kLi the partial derivative of Li with respect to the k-th variable k = 1, 2, the implicit function
theorem gives
y′i(ζ) = −
∂2Li
∂1Li
(yi(ζ), ζ) =
Gˆ′i(yi(ζ))− Lˆ
′
i(ζ)
Gˆ′′i (yi(ζ))(yi(ζ)− ζ)
, ζ ∈ Oi, i = 1, 2. (3.29)
Step 1 (y2 is monotonic decreasing). First we want to prove that y2( · ) decreases monotonically
on O2. For ζ ∈ O2 it holds y2(ζ) > yˆ2 > ζ. Hence by Lemma 3.1-(i) we have Gˆ
′′
2(y2(ζ))(y2(ζ)−
ζ) > 0 because Gˆ2 is convex, and Gˆ
′
2(y2(ζ)) < 0 by Lemma 3.1-(iii). By assumption (ii) we
also have Lˆ′2(ζ) > 0 for ζ ∈ O2, since Lˆ2 is increasing on (0, y˜2) by Lemma 3.1. Therefore we
have from (3.29) that y2 is decreasing on O2 as claimed. From Lemma 3.6 we find the maximum
value y2(0+) = y
∞
2 .
Since the optimal boundaries constructed in Theorem 3.2 have the fixed point property that
y∗1 = y1(y2(y
∗
1)) (cf. (3.15)–(3.16)), it is sufficient to show monotonicity of ζ 7→ y1(ζ) on the
interval ζ ∈ (yˆ2, y
∞
2 ), which contains the range of y2( · ). This is done in the next step.
Step 2 (y1 is monotonic increasing). Taking ζ ∈ O1 we have y1(ζ) ∈ O2 and by (i) of Lemma 3.1
we have Gˆ′′1(y1(ζ))(y1(ζ)− ζ) < 0. Corollary 3.7 and Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3.2 justify
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setting y∞1 = y1(y
∞
2 ). Hence we can write Gˆ
′
1(y1(y
∞
2 )) = Gˆ
′
1(y
∞
1 ) and since we are assuming
Gˆ′1(y
∞
1 ) < Lˆ
′
1(y
∞
2 ), then
y′1(y
∞
2 ) > 0. (3.30)
Let us now study the sign of the function U : (yˆ2, y
∞
2 )→ R, where U(ζ) := Gˆ
′
1(y1(ζ))−Lˆ
′
1(ζ).
Assume that U has a zero at ζo1 or, equivalently, that y
′
1(ζ
o
1) = 0. Then since L1(y1(ζ
o
1), ζ
o
1 ) = 0
(cf. (3.3)) and U(ζo1) = 0, there is a straight line which is tangent both to Lˆ1, at ζ
o
1 , and to
Gˆ1, at y1(ζ
o
1). Since Lˆ1 is convex for y < yˇ1 and Lˆ1 < Gˆ1 it is easy to see that we must have
ζo1 > yˇ1, otherwise the tangent would lie below Lˆ1 on (0, ζ
o
1 ) and violate Lˆ1 < Gˆ1 at y1(ζ
o
1 ).
Now we claim that if such ζo1 exists, then
U > 0 and y′1 < 0 on (ζ
o
1 , y
∞
2 ). (3.31)
Since the latter inequality would contradict (3.30), it would then follow that y′1(·) must be
strictly positive on (yˆ2, y
∞
2 ).
Hence, to conclude it remains to prove (3.31). For this we use y′1(ζ
o
1 ) = 0 and observe that
U ′(ζo1 ) =
(
Gˆ
′′
1 (y1(ζ))y
′
1(ζ)− Lˆ
′′
1(ζ)
)∣∣∣
ζ=ζo1
= −Lˆ
′′
1(ζ
o
1) > 0, (3.32)
since ζo1 > yˇ1. Hence U may only equal zero with strictly positive derivative, so it has at most
one zero ζo1 and then (3.31) holds.
Step 3 (Uniqueness of the solution to (3.4)). From Theorem 3.2 we know that there exists
(y∗1 , y
∗
2) ∈ O2 ×O1 such that y
∗
2 = y2(y
∗
1) and y
∗
1 = y1(y
∗
2). The monotonicity of both y1 and y2
obtained above implies that this pair is unique in O2×O1, and hence there is a unique solution
to (3.4).
3.2 The case of an entrance-not-exit boundary
In this section we extend the methodology developed above to the case when x is an entrance-
not-exit boundary and x is a natural boundary for X. This setting includes for example certain
CIR and Bessel processes (see for instance [23]). For the fundamental solutions φr and ψr we
have that (3.1), (3.2), (2.9) continue to hold if we replace (see [8], Sec. 2, par. 10)
lim
x↓x
ψr(x) = 0 by lim
x↓x
ψr(x) > 0, (3.33)
lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= −∞ by lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
> −∞. (3.34)
This setting is adopted in the remainder of this section. We first examine the geometric
properties associated with the classes A1, A2, as was done previously in Lemma 3.1, under the
new boundary behaviour for x. The asymptotic behaviour of Hˆ as y ↑ +∞ is exactly the same as
in Lemma 3.1 since the upper endpoint of I is again natural. Notice as well that Hˆ(0+) = 0 by
definition of Ai and that Hˆ
′(0+) always exists by convexity or concavity. Compared to Lemma
3.1, the difference in the present setting is that functions in A1 and A2 may now have finite
derivative at zero with either negative or positive sign.
Lemma 3.9.
i) If H ∈ A1 then Hˆ is convex on (0, yˆh) and concave on (yˆh,∞). Moreover Hˆ(0+) = 0,
limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = +∞ and H is monotonic increasing on (yˆh,+∞).
In addition if Hˆ ′(0+) < 0 then Hˆ has a unique global minimum in (0, yˆh).
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ii) If H ∈ A2 then Hˆ is concave on (0, yˆh) and convex on (yˆh,∞). Moreover Hˆ(0+) = 0,
limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = −∞ and Hˆ is monotonic decreasing on (yˆh,+∞).
In addition if Hˆ ′(0+) > 0 then Hˆ has a unique global maximum in (0, yˆh).
Notice that by (ii) of Lemma 3.9, Lemma 3.6 continues to hold. We now examine the effect of
the modified geometry on the remaining results.
In the case that Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞, all geometrical considerations are identical to those of the
setting of Section 3.1 and so the proof of the next result is the same as that of Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.10. If Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞ then Theorem 3.2 continues to hold when x is an entrance-
not-exit boundary.
Next we analyse cases in which Gˆ′1(0+) ∈ (−∞, 0). Firstly we establish the existence of
equilibria having a degenerate version of the threshold type structure (1.3), in the sense that we
formally take x∗1 = x.
Proposition 3.11. Let Assumption 2.6 hold, let Gˆ′1(0+) < 0 and recall τ
∞
2 := τ2(x
∞
2 ) from
Lemma 3.6. Then (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
≤ Gˆ′1(0+) (3.35)
with y∞2 = Fr(x
∞
2 ).
Proof. Step 1 (Sufficiency). Suppose (3.35) holds and let P2 choose the stopping time τ
∞
2 which
is optimal in problem (3.27), so that P1 is faced with solving (3.28). Due to condition (3.35), the
largest convex function W1 dominated by Gˆ1 on [0, y
∞
2 ] such that W1(y) = Lˆ1(y), for y ≥ y
∞
2 ,
describes the value function (see details in Appendix A.4). This W1 is given by the straight line
starting from the origin and passing through (y∞2 , Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )). Therefore due to strict convexity
of Gˆ1 at zero, P1’s best reply to τ
∞
2 is the stopping time τ1(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = x} = +∞
a.s. (since the entrance-not-exit boundary x is unattainable in finite time). Since τ∞2 is also P2’s
best reply to τ1(x) we have a Nash equilibrium.
Step 2 (Necessity). We show necessity by contradiction. Suppose that (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash
equilibrium and that (3.35) does not hold.
Let P2 choose the stopping time τ
∞
2 so that P1 must solve (3.28). Since (3.35) does not hold
it is not possible to draw a straight line joining the origin to (y∞2 , Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )) and lying below Gˆ1
on (0, y∞2 ). This line would be P1’s payoff for never stopping, therefore τ1 = +∞ cannot be a
best reply.
The above proposition shows that the construction of Theorem 3.2 may break down in some
cases, due to the geometry of Gˆ1. Hence in our present setting establishing the existence of
an equilibrium requires different conditions on the cost functions, such as those in the next
proposition (and indeed there may be cases where no equilibrium can be found in our class of
strategies (1.3)).
Proposition 3.12. Let
−∞ < Gˆ′1(0+) <
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
< 0 (3.36)
and assume limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞ and yT ≤ yˆ2, where
yT := sup{y > 0 : Gˆ
′
1(0+)y = Lˆ1(y)}, with sup{∅} = 0, (3.37)
then Theorem 3.2 continues to hold when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary.
Nonzero-Sum Dynkin Games 17
Proof. Since Gˆ′1(0+)y does not cross Lˆ1(y) for y > yT , it must be that Lˆ1(y)− Gˆ
′
1(0+)y is either
strictly positive or strictly negative for y > yT . However the latter would violate (3.36), since
y∞2 > yˆ2 ≥ yT , and hence is impossible. Then we must have Lˆ1(y) − Gˆ
′
1(0+)y > 0 for y > yˆ2.
Hence by strict convexity of Gˆ1 in (0, yˆ1) and a simple geometric argument, for ζ > yˆ2 one can
always construct a unique straight line passing through (ζ, Lˆ1(ζ)) and tangent to Gˆ1 at a point
of (0, yˆ1). Thus L1( · , ζ) has a unique root y1(ζ) ∈ (0, yˆ1) for each ζ > yˆ2.
This argument shows that Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.2 may be carried out in the
present setting. Step 1 is analogous, and Step 3 follows.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.12, we notice that Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4
continue to hold, i.e. any solution of (3.4) leads to a Nash equilibrium of threshold type and to
the related analytical properties of the equilibrium payoffs.
Remark 3.13. 1. It is important to notice that for the existence of an equilibrium we have not
examined whether or not Lˆ2 and Gˆ2 have maxima (see the proof of Theorem 3.2). Instead the
existence of these maxima and their position is used in Theorem 3.8 to establish uniqueness of
the equilibrium. In the current setting Lˆ2 and Gˆ2 have maxima if and only if Lˆ
′
2(0+) > 0 and
Gˆ′2(0+) > 0. Therefore assuming the latter along with conditions of Proposition 3.12 we have
that Theorem 3.8 holds.
2. Even though φr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↓ x, when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary condition
(2.10) may become more restrictive. For instance for a Bessel process with index ν = 1/2
(i.e. dimension δ = 3) one has φr(x) ∼ 1/x as x→ 0 (see [8] Appendix 2, pp. 638 and 654). In
this case, we may relax (2.10) for G1 by requiring
lim
x↓x
G1
φr
(x) = AG1 ∈ (−∞,+∞).
All the above arguments can then be adapted to establish the existence and uniqueness results for
Nash equilibria. We omit further details here because in the next section we analyse a similar
situation in the case when x is an exit-not-entrance boundary and (2.10) becomes a serious
restriction.
3.3 The case of an exit-not-entrance boundary
Here we extend the analysis carried out in the previous two sections by addressing the case of
a diffusion with a lower exit-not-entrance boundary x and an upper natural boundary x. We
sketch most proofs, drawing out key differences with the previous arguments.
Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (2.9) continue to hold if we replace
lim
x↓x
φr(x) = +∞ by lim
x↓x
φr(x) < +∞, (3.38)
lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0 by lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
> 0. (3.39)
This setting is adopted in the remainder of this section.
We see that φr(x+) is now finite so that imposing (2.10) on the stopping costs requires them
to vanish at x (recall that φr is positive). Hence from now on we shall relax the definition of
the set A by replacing the condition (2.10) with
lim
x↓x
H
φr
(x) = AH (3.40)
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for some AH ∈ R depending on H. For any H ∈ A Dynkin’s formula, standard localisation and
(2.8) give
H(x) = AHφr(x)−W
−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy + ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy
]
(3.41)
and for (H/φr)
′(x) we have the same expression as in (2.14).
The geometric implications of the present setting are as follows. Since limx↓x(φ
′
r/S
′)(x) =
−∞ as in the natural boundary case, one can prove as in Lemma 3.1 that
H ∈ A1 ⇒ Hˆ
′(0+) = −∞ and H ∈ A2 ⇒ Hˆ
′(0+) = +∞. (3.42)
Thanks to the latter observation one has that, under the new definition of A, Lemma 3.1
holds for in the same form with only the exception of the lower boundary conditions: now indeed
we have Hˆ(0+) = AH . As one may expect the sign of AG1 plays a crucial role in determining
the existence of Nash equilibria. We study the two possible cases below, while we always assume
AG2 ≥ 0 for simplicity.
Proposition 3.14. If AG1 ≤ 0 then Theorem 3.2 holds when x is an exit-not-entrance boundary.
Proof. Condition (3.42) implies that the construction of an equilibrium follows as in the proof
of Theorem 3.2 up to trivial adjustments.
We now consider AG1 > 0 but with the additional requirement
inf
x∈I
G1(x) < 0. (3.43)
In this case, from the above mentioned geometry of Gˆi there exists a unique straight line
passing through the origin and tangent to Gˆ1. We denote the tangency point by (yS , Gˆ1(yS))
so that yS ∈ (0, yˆ1) is the unique solution of
Gˆ1(yS) = ySGˆ
′
1(yS). (3.44)
Repeating arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.11, up to straightforward modifications,
we obtain a similar result:
Proposition 3.15. Let AG1 > 0 and assume (3.43). Let Assumption 2.6 hold with (3.40)
in place of (2.10). Let also τ∞2 = τ2(x
∞
2 ) be optimal for (3.27). Then (σI , τ
∞
2 ) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
Gˆ′1(yS) >
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.45)
with y∞2 = Fr(x
∞
2 ).
We now introduce
yˆT := sup{y ≥ yS, Gˆ
′
1(yS)y = Lˆ1(y)}, with sup{∅} = yS, (3.46)
which will play a similar role to yT in the previous section. Before stating the next result we
recall that since Gˆ2 is concave to the left of xˆ2, an optimal boundary for P2 will never lie in
(x, xˆ2) (see Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
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Proposition 3.16. Assume that AG1 > 0, that (3.43) holds and
Gˆ′1(yS) ≤
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
< 0. (3.47)
Assume also that yˆT < yˆ2 and limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞. Set xS := F
−1
r (yS) and σS := inf{t ≥ 0 :
Xt ≥ xS} ∧ σI, then with (3.40) in place of (2.10) in Assumption 2.6 one has
a) the couple (σS ,+∞) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈ (x, xS ];
b) the couple (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) of Theorem 3.2 is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x > xS.
Proof. We omit details of the proof which involve the repetition of arguments employed several
times above. In terms of the problem geometry, the only difference in the present case is that for
any y0 > yˆ2 the largest convex function W1 dominated by Gˆ1 and passing through (y0, Lˆ1(y0))
has at most two straight portions: i) the usual one connecting Lˆ1(y0) to Gˆ1 via the smooth-fit
equation L1(y1(y0), y0) = 0 and ii) the straight line rS(y) := Gˆ
′
1(yS) y for y ∈ [0, yS ]. Proposition
A.3 shows that W1 provides P1’s minimal expected cost in this setting.
If x ∈ (x, xS ] then with probability one P1 stops prior to P2, at time σS, because Gˆ2 is concave
on [0, yS ]. Hence a) holds, because stopping in finite time can only increase P2’s expected cost.
On the other hand b) is obtained as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
In the setting of Proposition 3.16, for each x the additional assumptions of Theorem 3.8 are
again sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibria we have obtained. Similarly they are also
sufficient in the case AG1 ≤ 0.
We also remark that for AG1 ≤ 0, Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 hold in the same form
whereas for AG1 > 0 they hold in a slightly more complex form. We provide a full statement for
completeness but skip the proof as it is the same as the original one up to minor adjustments.
Proposition 3.17. Let all the assumptions of Proposition 3.16 hold. Let (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1) ×
(yˆ2,+∞) be a solution of (3.4) and for xi := F
−1
r (yi), i = 1, 2 set
τˆ1 := τ1(x1), τˆ2 := τ2(x2). (3.48)
Then the couple (τˆ1, τˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈ [xS , x) whereas the
couple (σS ,+∞) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈ (x, xS).
Moreover the equilibrium payoffs of the two players, i.e. vi(x) = Ji(τˆ1, τˆ2;x), i = 1, 2, are
given by the functions
v1(x) :=

p1ψr(x), x < x < xS ,
G1(x), xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x) + q1φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
L1(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.49)
and
v2(x) :=

p2ψr(x), x < x < xS ,
L2(x), xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x) + q2φr(x), x1 < x < x2
G2(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.50)
with mi, qi, i = 1, 2 as in Proposition 3.4, p1 := G1(xS)/ψr(xS) and p2 := L2(xS)/ψr(xS). Also
v1 ∈ C(I) with v1 ∈W
2,∞
loc (x, x2) and v2 ∈ C(I) with v2 ∈W
2,∞
loc (x1, x).
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3.4 An alternate sufficient condition
In this section we consider similar preferences for the two players, in the sense that both stopping
cost functions are drawn from the class A1 (or both drawn from A2). This implies that we must
necessarily drop part (ii) of Assumption 2.6. Throughout the section we assume again that
x is natural and x is either natural or entrance-not-exit. We will refer below to the stopping
problems
inf
ρ
Ex
[
e−rρGi(Xρ)
]
, i = 1, 2. (3.51)
Proposition 3.18. Let (i) and (iii) of Assumption 2.6 hold. Assume now that G1, G2 ∈ A1,
with infx∈I Gi(x) < 0. Then, recalling (1.4), there exist x
′
i ∈ I, i = 1, 2 such that ρ
1,∞
i := τ1(x
′
i),
i = 1, 2 are optimal for (3.51).
Moreover in the game (1.1)-(1.2) we have:
1. if x′1 > x
′
2 then the couple (ρ
1,∞
1 ,+∞) realises a Nash equilibrium;
2. if x′1 < x
′
2 then the couple (+∞, ρ
1,∞
2 ) realises a Nash equilibrium;
3. if x′1 = x
′
2, then both the couples (ρ
1,∞
1 ,+∞) and (+∞, ρ
1,∞
2 ) realise Nash equilibria.
Proof. For i = 1, 2 the existence of x′i may be easily verified since (3.51) is an optimal stopping
problem of the type studied in [12] (notice that infx∈I Gi(x) < 0, i = 1, 2 guarantees that
the trivial choice ρ = +∞, Px-a.s. is not optimal in (3.51)). The geometric solution method
described therein may therefore be applied, namely the construction of the largest non-positive
convex function dominated by Gˆi. Under the current assumptions, Gˆi has a unique negative
minimum at yi ∈ (0, yˆi) (recall Definition 2.7). It follows that the stopping sets for problems
(3.51) are of the form (x, x′i] with x
′
i := F
−1
r (yi) for i = 1, 2. Note that a separate verification
argument is not required in this case, since the sufficiency of this construction is proved in [12].
Next we establish the equilibria. We only consider the case x′1 > x
′
2 as the other ones are
analogous. Let us start by assuming that P1 stops at ρ
1,∞
1 and analyse P2’s best reply. When
the game is started at x ≤ x′1, P2 can either stop and incur a cost G2(x), or continue (i.e. picking
any τ2 > 0) and incur a cost L2(x). Hence the payoff for P2 is L2(x)1{τ2>0} + G2(x)1{τ2=0},
which is clearly minimised by choosing τ2 > 0 a.s., since L2 < G2. Hence J2(ρ
1,∞
1 , τ2, x) = L2(x)
for all x ≤ x′1 and any τ2 > 0, and in particular this is true for τ2 = +∞.
Now for x > x′1, P2 is faced with the optimisation problem
u(x) := inf
τ
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
+ e−rρ
1,∞
1 L2(Xρ1,∞1
)1{τ>ρ1,∞1 }
]
. (3.52)
Noticing that G2/φr has the same monotonicity properties as Gˆ2 (Appendix A.1), and that the
game is terminated by P1 if X hits x
′
1 it is clear that
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
≥ inf
z≥x′1
(
G2
φr
)
(z)Ex
[
e−rτφr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
=
(
G2
φr
)
(x′1)Ex
[
e−rτφr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
.
Since also L2 < G2 and (e
−rtφr(Xt))t≥0 is a martingale, we obtain the following lower bound:
u(x)
≥ inf
τ
((
G2
φr
)
(x′1)Ex
[
e−rτφr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
+
(
L2
φr
)
(x′1)Ex
[
e−rρ
1,∞
1 φr(Xρ1,∞1
)1
{τ>ρ1,∞1 }
])
≥ inf
τ
((
L2
φr
)
(x′1)Ex
[
e−r(τ∧ρ
1,∞
1 )φr(Xτ∧ρ1,∞1
)
])
=
(
L2
φr
)
(x′1)φr(x). (3.53)
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Taking τ = +∞, P-a.s. in (3.52) (and recalling (2.2)), it now follows from the Laplace transforms
(2.6) that the lower bound above is attained. Hence it is optimal for P2 to choose τ = +∞ Px-
a.s. for all x > x′1.
In conclusion we have shown that τ = +∞ is a best reply of P2 to P1’s stopping rule ρ
1,∞
1 .
Since P1’s best reply to τ = +∞ is by definition ρ
1,∞
1 , we have reached an equilibrium with
(ρ1,∞1 ,+∞) as claimed.
Remark 3.19. It is not difficult to check that under (i) and (iii) of Assumption 2.6, letting
G1, G2 ∈ A2, there exist x
′
i ∈ I, i = 1, 2 such that ρ
2,∞
i := τ2(x
′
i), i = 1, 2 are optimal for (3.51).
Moreover in the game (1.1)-(1.2) we have:
1. if x′1 > x
′
2 then the couple (+∞, ρ
2,∞
2 ) realises a Nash equilibrium;
2. if x′1 < x
′
2 then the couple (ρ
2,∞
1 ,+∞) realises a Nash equilibrium;
3. if x′1 = x
′
2, then both the couples (+∞, ρ
2,∞
2 ) and (ρ
2,∞
1 ,+∞) realise Nash equilibria.
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A Appendix
A.1 Convexity of Hˆ
We show here that Hˆ of (2.16) is strictly convex at y > 0 if and only if (LX − r)H(x) > 0 at
x = F−1r (y). We simply work out explicitly calculations indicated by [12, Sec. 6]. For y = Fr(x)
it is obvious that Hˆ ′(y) = g(x) with g(x) := (H/φr)
′(x)/F ′r(x) so that Hˆ
′′(y) = g′(x)/F ′r(x).
Since Fr is strictly increasing, we only need to evaluate g
′(x). This can be easily done by
observing that
F ′r(x) =
(ψ′rφr − ψrφ
′
r)(x)
(φr)2(x)
=W
S′(x)
(φr)2(x)
and g(x) =
(H ′φr −Hφ
′
r)(x)
W S′(x)
from which we get
g′(x) =
φr(x)(S
′H ′′ − S′′H ′)(x)
W (S′)2(x)
−
H(x)(S′φ′′r − S
′′φ′r)(x)
W (S′)2(x)
.
Now we use that S′′(x) = −2µ(x)S′(x)/σ2(x) to obtain
g′(x) =
2
W σ2(x)(S′)(x)
[
φr(x)LXH(x)−H(x)LXφr(x)
]
=
2φr(x)
W σ2(x)(S′)(x)
(LXH − rH)(x),
where in the last equality we have used that LXφr = rφr. The last expression proves the claim
and we remark that the result holds even if r = r(x) is state dependent.
A.2 Proofs of some lemmas
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Recalling the notation of Section 2.3, let H ∈ A1. From Lemma 2.5 we
immediately get i). We notice that indeed Fr(x+) = 0 and Fr(x−) = +∞ due to (3.1) and the
limit at zero of Hˆ is verified from the definition of A.
If we now show that
(a) lim
y↑∞
Hˆ(y) = +∞, and (b) lim
y↓0
Hˆ ′(y) = −∞, (A-1)
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we can then conclude parts ii) and iii).
First we prove (a) above. By the definition of A1, for fixed δ > 0 there exists εδ > 0 such
that h(z) ≤ −εδ for any z ∈ [xh + δ, x). Moreover, for any x ∈ [xh + δ, x), (2.13) implies
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ xh+δ
x
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz + φr(x)
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
+ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
]
(A-2)
≥ −W−1
[
φr(x)Cδ − εδφr(x)
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z)dz − εδψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz
]
with Cδ :=
∫ xh+δ
x
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz. Using (2.9) we have∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z)dz =
1
r
[
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
−
ψ′r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
and by using (3.2) also, we obtain∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz = −
1
r
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
.
Substituting these into (A-2), the right hand side of (A-2) is equal to
−W−1
[
Cδ +
εδ
r
ψ′r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
φr(x) +
εδ
r
, (A-3)
and so we have
H(x)
φr(x)
≥ −W−1
[
Cδ +
εδ
r
ψ′r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
+
εδ
rφr(x)
. (A-4)
Using (3.1) we obtain
lim
x↑x
H(x)
φr(x)
= +∞,
and since limy↑∞ F
−1
r (y) = x, we have established part (a).
To prove (b) let δ > 0, take x < xh − δ, and let y = Fr(x). Note that since H ∈ A1 there
exists εδ > 0 such that h(z) ≥ εδ for z ∈ (x, xh − δ] and we obtain
Hˆ ′(y) =−
1
W
[ ∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz +
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
]
(A-5)
≤−
1
W
[ ∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz + εδ
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz
]
=−W−1
[∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz +
εδ
r
(φ′r(xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ)
−
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
)]
,
where the first line follows from (2.14) and the chain rule and the third line by (2.9). Then,
letting y ↓ 0 (equivalently x ↓ x) and using (3.2), we conclude Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞. The case H ∈ A2
follows by symmetric arguments.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Problem (3.27) is the same as the one in Appendix A.4.1 below with
xo = x therein. Once we prove existence and uniqueness of y
∞
2 then optimality of τ
∞
2 follows
from Proposition A.1.
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The equation Gˆ′2(y)y−Gˆ2(y) = 0 with y > yˆ2 expresses the tangency condition for a straight
line passing through the origin and tangent to Gˆ2 at a point in (yˆ2,+∞). If a solution to that
equation exists then the convexity of Gˆ2 in (yˆ2,+∞) implies that it must be unique. For the
existence it is sufficient to observe that
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)yˆ2 <
∫ yˆ2
0
Gˆ′2(s)ds = Gˆ2(yˆ2)
since Gˆ2 is strictly concave in (0, yˆ2). Recalling (3.12) we get limy→∞[Gˆ
′
2(y)y − Gˆ2(y)] = +∞
and therefore there exists a unique y∞2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞).
A.3 Some remarks on state dependent discounting
Here we illustrate the case of a state dependent discount rate (r(Xt))t≥0. In this setting the
payoffs (1.1) become:
J1(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−
∫ τ1
0 r(Xt)dtG1(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2} + e
−
∫ τ2
0 r(Xt)dtL1(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}
]
, (A-6)
J2(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−
∫ τ2
0 r(Xt)dtG2(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1} + e
−
∫ τ1
0 r(Xt)dtL2(Xτ1)1{τ1≤τ2}
]
. (A-7)
In order to extend the methodology applied above, we make sufficient assumptions on r to
ensure the existence of strictly monotonic and strictly positive fundamental solutions φr, ψr to
the ODE
1
2σ
2(x)f ′′(x) + µ(x)f ′(x)− r(x)f(x) = 0, x ∈ I. (A-8)
In particular we assume that r(x) is bounded, continuous and strictly positive for x ∈ I. In this
case we again have
Ex
[
e−
∫ τ(y)
0 r(Xt)dt
]
=

ψr(x)
ψr(y)
, x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
, x > y,
(A-9)
for x, y ∈ I and τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y} (see [11], Prop. 2.1). The limits at the endpoints
of the domain I of functions φr, ψr, φ
′
r/S
′ and ψ′r/S
′ remain the same as in the previous
sections, depending on whether x is natural, entrance-not-exit or exit-not-entrance. Instead of
the expressions (2.9) we must now consider their generalisation (see par. 9 and 10, Ch. 2 of [8])
ψ′r(b)
S′(b)
−
ψ′r(a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)ψr(y)m
′(y)dy,
φ′r(b)
S′(b)
−
φ′r(a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)φr(y)m
′(y)dy, (A-10)
for x < a < b < x.
It is then easy to see that all the arguments that we have used for the construction of Nash
equilibria in the above sections can be repeated for state dependent discounting and all the
results carry over to this setting with no additional difficulties. In particular one should notice
that positivity and boundedness of r(·) allow us to find bounds similar to those that led to some
of our key inequalities (e.g. (A-3) and (A-5)); for example, setting r := supz∈I r(z) the second
term in the first equality of (A-5) can be bounded from below as follows∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz ≥
1
r
∫ xh−δ
x
r(z)φr(z)m
′(z)dz =
1
r
(φ′r(xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ)
−
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
)
and the rest of the proof follows in the same way also with state dependent discounting.
We also remark that the argument used to infer convexity and concavity of the transformed
functions Hˆ in Lemma 3.1 and 3.9 holds in the same form, i.e. Hˆ(y) is strictly convex if and
only if 12σ
2(x)H ′′(x) + µ(x)H ′(x)− r(x)H(x) > 0 with y = Fr(x).
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A.4 Two Useful Optimal Stopping Problems
The proof of Theorem 3.2 involves solving, for each player in turn, an optimal stopping problem
whose stopping cost function depends on the strategy of the other player. Our approach to such
problems is inspired by a characterisation via convex analysis due to Dynkin, later developed
in [12]. Since it is beyond the scope of the present paper to develop a complete theory for such
problems, however, we adopt the following hybrid approach. A geometric construction similar
to that employed in the latter references is first used to propose a candidate stopping region
and payoff. This candidate solution is then verified in a second step. In this way we obtain a
convenient geometric characterisation of the stopping set and payoff for the particular optimal
stopping problems encountered in Theorem 3.2.
A.4.1 A First Optimal Stopping Problem
Recall Definition 2.4 along with the notation of (2.15) and (2.16), and consider a function
G ∈ A2. Denote by xˆ ∈ I the unique point at which LXG− rG changes its sign and take xo ∈ I
with xo < xˆ. Let us introduce the infinite time horizon optimal stopping problem with value
function
Vo(x) := inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ≤τo} + L(Xτo)e
−rτo1{τo<τ}
]
, (A-11)
where L(x) < G(x) for all x ∈ I and τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≤ xo}.
First we notice that if x ≤ xo, picking any τ gives a payoff equal to L(x)1{τ>0}+G(x)1{τ=0}.
The latter is minimised by choosing an arbitrary τ > 0 a.s., and
Vo(x) = L(x), for x ≤ xo. (A-12)
Further, the next standard argument shows that it is never optimal to stop for x < xˆ since
LXG− rG < 0. In fact if x < xˆ, the sub-optimal stopping time τˆ := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x ≥ xˆ} gives
Vo(x) ≤Ex
[
e−rτˆG(Xτˆ )1{τˆ≤τo} + L(Xτo)e
−rτo1{τo<τˆ}
]
≤Ex
[
e−r(τˆ∧τo)G(Xτˆ∧τo)
]
< G(x)
where the last inequality is obtained by using Dynkin’s formula and LXG− rG < 0 in (x, xˆ).
It then follows that if an optimal stopping time τ∗ exists then Px(τ∗ = τo) = 0 for all x ∈ I,
since xo < xˆ. Hence in (A-11) we could replace the event {τ ≤ τo} by the event {τ < τo} with no
loss of generality, thus avoiding potential problems concerning continuity of the value function
at xo.
Set yo := Fr(xo) and define the function
Q(y) :=
 Lˆ(y), 0 < y ≤ yo,Gˆ(y), y > yo. (A-13)
For yˆ := Fr(xˆ) we argue as in Section A.1 of this appendix and obtain that Gˆ is strictly concave
in (0, yˆ) and strictly convex in (yˆ,∞).
Let us consider the straight line ro(·) which passes through the point (yo, Q(yo)) and is
tangent to Q at a point y∗ > yˆ := Fr(xˆ). Existence of ro can be easily proven due to convex-
ity/concavity of Q (Section A.1) and we leave it to the reader. This line is expressed as
ro(y) = my + q, y > 0, (A-14)
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with {
m := Q(y∗)−Q(yo)
y∗−yo
,
q := Q(yo)−myo.
(A-15)
By the convexity of Gˆ (and therefore of Q) in (yˆ,+∞) the point y∗ is determined as the unique
y > yˆ that solves the tangency equation
Q(y)−Q(yo)
y − yo
= Q′(y). (A-16)
Proposition A.1. Let G ∈ A2. Assume there exists y∗ > yˆ solving (A-16) (which is then
unique). Recall (A-14) and (A-15) and define x∗ := F
−1
r (y∗) and the functions
W (y) :=

Lˆ(y), 0 < y ≤ yo
my + q, yo < y < y∗
Gˆ(y), y ≥ y∗,
(A-17)
and
V˜o(x) := φr(x)W (Fr(x)) =

L(x), x < x ≤ xo
mψr(x) + qφr(x), xo < x < x∗
G(x), x∗ ≤ x < x.
(A-18)
Then one has V˜o ≡ Vo and τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗} is optimal for problem (A-11).
Proof. If x ≤ xo there is clearly nothing to prove thanks to (A-12). Therefore, take x > xo
and notice by (A-18) that (LX − r)V˜o(x) = 0 if x ∈ (xo, x∗). Moreover, by Section A.1 we also
have that (LX − r)V˜o(x) ≥ 0 if x ∈ (x∗, x), since y∗ > yˆ and Gˆ is convex in (yˆ,∞). Also, by
construction, V˜o(x∗) = G(x∗), V˜
′
o (x∗) = G
′
(x∗), V˜o(xo) = L(xo) and V˜o ≤ G, for any x > xo.
Since V˜o ∈W
2,∞
loc ((x0, x)) we can apply Itoˆ-Tanaka’s formula to the process (e
−rtV˜o(X
x
t ))t≥0 on
the time interval [0, τ ∧ τo], for arbitrary τ ∈ T , and obtain
V˜o(x) ≤ Ex
[
e−rτ∧τo V˜o(Xτ∧τo)
]
≤ Ex
[
e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ≤τo} + L(Xτo)e
−rτo1{τ>τo}
]
(A-19)
and hence V˜o ≤ Vo. Then repeating the argument with τ = τ∗ we find
V˜o(x) = Ex
[
e−rτ∗G(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤τo} + L(Xτo)e
−rτo1{τ∗>τo}
]
and therefore V˜o = Vo and τ∗ is optimal.
Notice that, when restricted to [yo,+∞), the function W is the largest convex function
dominated by Q. The latter condition makes the result slightly different to the geometric
characterisation in [12] (they have Gˆ = Lˆ and then W is non-positive, see also [31]).
A.4.2 A Second Optimal Stopping Problem
For the next optimal stopping problem we take the same setup as in Section A.4.1, with the
modifications that G ∈ A1, xo > xˆ and τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
x
t ≥ xo}. Again we recall that if an
optimal stopping time τ∗ exists then Px(τ∗ = τo) = 0 for all x ∈ I so that the indicator functions
in (A-11) may effectively be taken with strict inequalities only. As before we denote
Q(y) :=
{
Gˆ(y), 0 < y < yo,
Lˆ(y), y ≥ yo.
(A-20)
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In contrast to the situation in Section A.4.1, in the present setting we will consider two possible
geometries for this optimal stopping problem, in Propositions A.2 and A.3 respectively. This is
necessary because it may in principle be optimal to stop anywhere in the interval (x, xˆ) and the
geometry of Gˆ on (0, yˆ) depends on the boundary behaviour of X at x, which we vary through
the paper.
In what follows we write
m¯ := Q(yo)/yo (A-21)
and recall that for a not non-singular lower boundary x we have ψr(x)/φr(x)→ 0 as x→ x.
Proposition A.2. Let G ∈ A1. If
Q(y) > m¯y for all y ∈ (0, yo) (A-22)
then the function
V˜o(x) :=
{
m¯ ψr(x), x < x < xo,
L(x), xo ≤ x < x,
(A-23)
is such that V˜o ≡ Vo and, further, the stopping time τ∗ := +∞ is optimal for problem (A-11).
Proof. Clearly V˜o ∈ C
2
b (x, xo) and LxV˜o− rV˜o = 0 on (x, xo). By the same geometric arguments
as in the proof of Proposition A.1, and using A-22, we also have V˜o(x) ≤ G(x). Hence by
applying Itoˆ’s formula for x ∈ (x, xo) and any τ we get (A-19) and therefore V˜o(x) ≤ Vo(x).
For fixed ε > 0, picking τ = τε := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ x+ ε} we also find
V˜o(x) =Ex
[
e−r(τε∧τo)V˜o(Xτε∧τo)
]
=Ex
[
e−rτε V˜o(Xτε)1{τε≤τo} + e
−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<τε}
]
=m¯
ψr(x+ ε)
φr(x+ ε)
λo(x) + Ex
[
e−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<τε}
]
,
with
λo(x) :=
ψr(x)φr(xo)− ψr(xo)φr(x)
(ψr/φr)(x+ ε)φr(xo)− ψr(xo)
by (A-23) and equation (4.3) in [12]. Letting ε→ 0 we have τε → σI and ψr(x+ε)/φr(x+ε)→ 0.
Thus, taking limits and using dominated convergence and (2.2), we obtain
V˜o(x) = Ex
[
e−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<∞}
]
≥ Vo(x),
hence completing the proof.
Because of the convexity of Gˆ on (0, yˆ), if
Gˆ(0+) > 0 and inf
y∈(0,yo)
[Gˆ(y)− m¯y] ≤ 0 (A-24)
then there exist two points 0 < y∗,1 ≤ y∗,2 < yˆ such that the straight line r1(y) := m¯1y, with
m¯1 := Q(y∗,1)/y∗,1, is tangent to Q(y∗,1) while y∗,2 solves (A-16). In this case we have the
following proposition, whose proof we omit due to its similarity to Proposition A.1.
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Proposition A.3. Let G ∈ A1 be such that (A-24) is satisfied and let y∗,1 and y∗,2 be the points
described above. Then writing x∗,i := F
−1
r (y∗,i) for i = 1, 2 and defining m, q as in (A-15), the
function
V˜o(x) :=

m¯1ψ(x), x < x < x∗,1,
G(x), x∗,1 ≤ x ≤ x∗,2,
mψr(x) + qφr(x), x∗,2 < x < xo,
L(x), xo ≤ x < x,
(A-25)
is such that V˜o ≡ Vo. Further the stopping time τ∗ := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xs ∈ [x∗,1, x∗,2]} is optimal for
problem (A-11).
It is immediate to check that, when restricted to the domain (0, yo], the function W (y) :=
(Vo/φr) ◦ F
−1
r (y) is the largest convex function dominated by Q. If Gˆ(0+) ≤ 0 then y∗,1 clearly
does not exist in (0, yo) and instead we state the following corollary, whose proof is left to the
reader.
Corollary A.4. Let G ∈ A1 with Gˆ(0+) ≤ 0 and assume y∗,2 exists as described above. Then
the results of Proposition A.3 hold with x∗,1 = x.
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